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and Andreas Heinimann
Abstract
This chapter aims to overcome the gap existing between case study research, which 
typically provides qualitative and process-based insights, and national or global inven-
tories that typically offer spatially explicit and quantitative analysis of broader patterns, 
and thus to present adequate evidence for policymaking regarding large-scale land 
acquisitions. Therefore, the chapter links spatial patterns of land acquisitions to under-
lying implementation processes of land allocation. Methodologically linking the 
described patterns and processes proved difficult, but we have identified indicators that 
could be added to inventories and monitoring systems to make linkage possible. 
Combining complementary approaches in this way may help to determine where pol-
icy space exists for more sustainable governance of land acquisitions, both geographi-
cally and with regard to processes of agrarian transitions. Our spatial analysis revealed 
two general patterns: (i) relatively large forestry-related acquisitions that target forested 
landscapes and often interfere with semi-subsistence farming systems; and (ii) smaller 
agriculture-related acquisitions that often target existing cropland and also interfere 
with semi-subsistence systems. Furthermore, our meta-analysis of land acquisition 
implementation processes shows that authoritarian, top-down processes dominate. 
Initially, the demands of powerful regional and domestic investors tend to override 
socio-ecological variables, local actors’ interests, and land governance mechanisms. As 
available land grows scarce, however, and local actors gain experience dealing with land 
acquisitions, it appears that land investments begin to fail or give way to more inclusive, 
bottom-up investment models.
1 Introduction
A growing body of scientific evidence on large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) 
is helping to inform the heated debate regarding this rapidly unfolding 
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phenomenon. Some researchers—particularly those using qualitative, in-
depth case studies—have examined land-acquisition processes within the 
dynamics of agrarian change and larger political-economic shifts. Other 
researchers have striven to establish quantitative inventories of LSLAs to 
improve our understanding of the scale and dimensions of land acquisitions 
at the national (Görgen et al., 2009; Schönweger et al., 2012; Üllenberg, 2009), 
regional (Friis and Reenberg, 2010), or global level (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Cotula, 
2012; Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). Based on such inventories, the World Bank 
has deemed 445 million hectares (ha) of land worldwide to be ‘marginal land’ 
that could benefit from agricultural investments because it is not forested 
or under protection and has population densities below 25 people per km2 
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
Both qualitative case-based approaches and quantitative inventory-based 
approaches have persistently met with difficulties and criticism when it comes 
to guiding policy on land investments. While case studies focussing on specific 
local contexts are good at capturing processes and interactions, they have lim-
ited geographical validity and are typically ill-suited to generalising and inform-
ing policy at higher spatial levels (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Messerli et al., 2013). 
By contrast, regional and global inventories based on quantitative approaches 
are useful for making large comparisons, but frequently lack insight into pro-
cesses and fail to account for variety and differentiation; they have also been 
criticised for relying on faulty or incomplete data sources and for lacking veri-
fication on the ground (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013). Similarly, hasty assessments 
about unused or underused ‘marginal’ land have been consistently refuted by 
intensive case study research (Borras Jr. et al., 2011; Dwyer, 2013; Nalepa and 
Bauer, 2012). This research has shown that land targeted by international land 
deals is often not idle at all, but rather is subject to claims and is used by peo-
ple who are increasingly being marginalised by processes of globalization.
From a policy perspective, it remains a point of dispute whether or to 
what extent LSLAs target marginal land and/or create marginalised pop-
ulations. Overall, the policy-related evidence provided by researchers 
appears ambiguous and often contradictory. Because of this, recent pro-
posals have recommended bringing together country-level and case-based 
research approaches, taking advantage of conceptual and methodological 
complementarities (Messerli et al., 2013; Scoones et al., 2013). Such a research 
agenda would aim at linking patterns of quantitative, place-based (spatially 
referenced) assessments of LSLAs to insights from processes-based, frequently 
qualitative case studies.
Supplying useful scientific evidence for decision-making and policy making 
has also proven difficult in South-East Asia. Here, LSLAs have emerged mainly 
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as a regional phenomenon, contrasting somewhat with the ‘land rush’ in 
Africa and Latin America where global drivers are seen as especially impor-
tant (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Such acquisitions reflect a broader picture of agri-
cultural and societal transformation, characterised by a rapid shift away from 
rural subsistence-oriented agriculture in favour of more urbanised societies 
and industrialised, market-based forms of land use. Often termed ‘agrarian 
transition’ (De Koninck, 2004; Rigg, 2006), this transformation comprises many 
simultaneously occurring processes such as agricultural intensification and ter-
ritorial expansion, market-based economic integration, rural-urban migration, 
new forms of regulations governing agricultural production, and urbanisation. 
None of these processes necessarily follow a linear path and their pace differs 
from place to place. Rural transformation processes vary considerably across 
the region and across different scales, making it difficult to properly concep-
tualise and understand changes in the Asian countryside as they occur (Rigg, 
2005). LSLAs have led to highly dissimilar outcomes from one place to another. 
Thus, using single case studies or locally obtained empirical results to formu-
late regional or national policy is highly problematic.
This paper focuses on land investments in Laos and Cambodia. The land 
resources in both countries are under significant pressure from LSLAs, espe-
cially as a result of foreign direct investment by neighbouring riparian coun-
tries. Our overall goal is to identify distinct spatio-temporal patterns of LSLAs 
across the two countries and to attempt to link them to recurrent or archetypal 
processes of implementation of land deals from concession granting to the 
final allocation of land. This encompasses two primary objectives: (1) meth-
odologically, we aim to explore and illustrate how quantitative, place-based 
(spatial) analysis of land investments can be linked to process-based, quali-
tative studies; (2) as regards content, we aim to improve—based on better 
methodology—the generalisation of evidence on LSLAs for policymaking and 
decision-making.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe our methodol-
ogy and the results of analysing spatial patterns of LSLAs based on country-
level inventories. Here, we focus on the origin of the investors, on crop 
types, and on geographical target contexts (including social and ecological 
characteristics). In section 3, we describe how we used a meta-analysis of case 
studies to identify key factors of LSLA implementation processes and recurrent 
linkages between these key factors. Based on these recurrent linkages, we pro-
pose four so-called archetypes of land acquisitions as the basis for a working 
typology of implementation processes. Finally, in section 4 we discuss whether 
and to what extent spatial patterns of land deals can be related to archetypes of 
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implementation processes in order to improve the validity and generalisation 
of research results for policymaking purposes.
2 Analysing Spatial Patterns of LSLAs in Laos and Cambodia
2.1 Materials and Methods
In both Laos and Cambodia, national databases of LSLAs have been gradually 
built using different information sources furnished by different agencies and 
initiatives. In Laos, the bulk of data was collected through an inventory of land 
concessions and leases (from the local level to the national level) conducted 
between 2007 and 2010, with additional updates and data cleaning occurring in 
2012 (Schönweger et al., 2012). Only 50 per cent of the granted deals collected 
in this inventory were spatially referenced. For the purpose of our analysis, 
only the spatially referenced deals were used, encompassing 597,600 ha of land 
(out of 1.1 million ha, in total, of granted land concessions and leases).
The Cambodian database was drawn together from a variety of information 
sources. It includes official data gathered by Open Development Cambodia 
(ODC, 2013); data from LICADHO (2013); data from NGO Forum (2012); and data 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Cambodia (2012); as 
well as our own field data. The resulting database combines data on land conces-
sions (with spatial-reference data) comprising 490 deals that cover 4.5 million ha; 
the most recent updates and data cleaning took place in September 2013.
Using these unique data sets, we conducted a descriptive analysis looking at 
investors’ country of origin, the intended purpose of the deal (by sub-sector), 
and the date of approval for each land deal. To gain some initial insights into 
the national-level characteristics of land acquisitions in Laos and Cambodia, 
we compared the geo-referenced land-deal data with other important spatially 
referenced country-level data sets, in particular those on poverty incidence, 
accessibility to provincial capitals, and land cover. Because the national land 
cover data sets for Laos and Cambodia were not comparable (due to differ-
ing methods and classifications), globally available data were used from the 
GlobCover 2009 land classification (Arino, 2010). We calculated the acces-
sibility of provincial capitals (i.e. travel time in minutes) with cost–distance 
algorithms in ArcGis 10, using national road data sets, digital elevation mod-
els, land cover data, and main rivers as inputs (Messerli et al., 2008). For 
Laos, we used village-level poverty data—from Epprecht et al. (2008)—that 
were calculated using small-area estimation based on figures from the 2005 
Lao Population and Housing Census and the 2003 Lao Expenditure and 
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Consumption Survey (LECS) III. For Cambodia, poverty measures were derived 
from the Identification of Poor Households Programme data set (Kingdom of 
Cambodia, 2012) and the Commune Database (NCCD, 2012) for 2008–2010.
2.2 Spatial Patterns of LSLAs in Laos and Cambodia
2.2.1 Dimensions and Scale of LSLAs
An openness to private investment in the form of land concessions has been 
present in the economic development policies of both countries for many 
years. In Cambodia, a new legal framework was adopted for land investment in 
2001; the same occurred in Laos in 2003. In both countries, a series of additional 
laws and decrees have reinforced and concretised the trend towards private 
land investment (NAoL, 2004; GoL 2008; RGC, 2005). Investors’ responses have 
not been slow in coming, giving rise to a veritable ‘land rush’ in both countries. 
The countries’ respective governments have also made private investments in 
land an explicit part of their official development strategies and policies. But 
the growing scale and pace of land concessions have proven highly challeng-
ing to govern properly, sparking criticism both locally and internationally. The 
total number of concessions granted in Laos increased fiftyfold between 2000 
and 2009, rising steeply after 2005 (Figure 6.1). In Cambodia, there was also a 
FIGURE 6.1 Trends of land concessions granted in Cambodia and Laos.
 Note: Figures for Cambodia do not include mining concessions, as no information 
about the granting date of mining concessions was available.
Source: Authors.
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sharp increase in land deals after 2005. The most impressive observation, how-
ever, remains that—starting in 2000—it took only eight years to double the 
area granted to investors, from 0.5 million ha in 2000 to over 1 million ha in 
2008, and only another four years to double it again, reaching over 2 million 
hectares in 2012.
Despite the announcement of moratoriums on new land concessions in 
Laos (2007, 2009, and 2012) and Cambodia (2012), these deals play a major role 
in the economies of each country and will continue to do so based on the sheer 
size of existing deals. Today, Laos has already granted approximately 2,640 land 
concessions for 1.1 million ha (Schönweger et al., 2012), while Cambodia has 
granted about 490 concessions for 4.5 million ha, including mining concessions. 
Notably, land granted as concessions or leases constitutes around 5 per cent 
of the territory of Laos and around 25 per cent of the territory of Cambodia.
2.2.2 Spatial Distribution of LSLAs
While land investments are spread throughout the two countries, there are 
regions where they are more clustered and more highly concentrated in terms 
of land area used (Figure 6.2): in the north of Laos, in the north and the north-
east of Cambodia, and also in the south-western region of Cambodia. With 
regard to the origin of investors, domestic investments play an important role 
in terms of the absolute number of deals in both countries. These domestic 
investments are distributed in a similar manner to foreign investments across 
each country.
2.2.3 Investors and Main Sub-Sectors Behind LSLAs
While in Cambodia domestic deals account for almost 50 per cent of the entire 
land area granted, in Laos they account for less than 15 per cent (Table 6.1). 
Consequently, domestic investors in Laos have much smaller deals (by area) 
on average. Non-domestic investments are dominated in both contexts by the 
following neighbouring countries: China, Vietnam, and Thailand. The prox-
imity of areas to country of origin of the investors who invest in those areas 
partly explains the distribution of these regional investments (Figure 6.2). 
Investments from foreign countries outside the region, aggregated here under 
the category ‘international’, only represent small shares (by area and number) 
of the remaining concessions (Table 6.1).
In terms of the intended purpose of deals, the forestry sub-sector—includ-
ing all forms of tree crops (mainly rubber, eucalyptus, and teak)—outweighs 
the agricultural sub-sector in both countries based on land area used: the 
figures are 15,157 km² (forestry) versus 2,813 km² (agriculture) in Cambodia; 
and 2,878 km² (forestry) versus 834 km² (agriculture) in Laos. Again, regional 
investors from neighbouring countries are the main source of forestry-related 
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FIGURE 6.2  Investment project locations in Laos (above) and Cambodia (below) by investors’ 
countries of origin and by subsectors.
Source: compiled based on Schönweger et al. (2012), ODC (2013), 
LICADHO (2013), NGO Forum (2012), and our own data collection.
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land deals in both countries taken together (53 per cent of deals), with domes-
tic investors also being very important in Cambodia (44 per cent of deals). 
International investors hold only 11 per cent of all forestry concessions in both 
countries combined. Agriculture-related land deals are generally smaller than 
forestry-related land deals. Agriculture-related investments are dominated by 
regional (40 per cent of deals) and domestic stakeholders (39 per cent of deals) 
in Laos and Cambodia combined; international investors account for another 
21 per cent of agriculture-related deals. It is also important to note the signifi-
cance of the mining sector in Laos, as it accounts for the biggest share of land 
(92 per cent) among the sub-sectors classified under ‘Other’ for that country 
(Table 6.1).
2.2.4 Geographic Contexts of Land Acquisitions at the National Level
Overlaying our map of land deals with earlier land cover data revealed some 
interesting spatial patterns. Overall, land concessions are mainly granted in 
forested landscapes (42 per cent) and in landscape mosaics of forest, shrub-
land, and grassland (39 per cent); in Laos, such landscape mosaics have histori-
cally been the site of small-scale (mainly shifting) cultivation. Other general 
patterns emerging in both countries are that forestry-related concessions (e.g. 
tree plantations) tend to be granted in forested landscapes, while deals with 
an agricultural focus tend to be granted in landscapes of existing cropland. In 
Laos, agriculture-related concessions are twice as likely to be granted in crop-
land landscapes than in other types of landscapes.
Moreover, our spatial analysis reveals that the vast majority of investments 
are located in relatively easily accessible areas. Concessions in agriculture are 
the closest to provincial capitals in both countries, with an average travel time 
of two hours. Forestry concessions come next with an average travel time of 
two hours and 41 minutes to provincial capitals. Finally, concessions in other 
sub-sectors average over four hours of travel time—this especially reflects the 
importance of mining concessions in Laos, which must be situated where min-
eral deposits are located, of course, regardless of how remote that situation 
is. In Laos, land concessions tend to be more accessible than in Cambodia. 
Nevertheless, the main investors (domestic, Chinese, and Vietnamese) also run 
projects in very remote areas of both countries.
2.2.5 Summarising Patterns of Forestry- and Agriculture-Related LSLAs
Laos and Cambodia have both experienced a sharp increase in LSLAs over the 
past decade, corresponding to a fiftyfold increase in the number of land deals 
in Laos and a fourfold increase in the area granted in Cambodia. The land 
acquisitions in Laos are smaller in size but greater in number, and in Cambodia 
fewer but larger. Our analysis of the geography of LSLAs in both countries 
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revealed some key commonalities and differences. Aware of the risks of over-
simplification, we nevertheless identified and defined the following general 
patterns and socio-ecological contexts of LSLAs.
First, forestry is the most important concession-related sub-sector in 
Cambodia and Laos based on the amount of land involved. Investors from 
neighbouring countries—especially Vietnam and China—play a bigger role in 
these forestry-related concessions than do international investors from outside 
the region. In Cambodia, domestic investors also play a key role in this sub-
sector. Forestry-related concessions are typically granted for large, contiguous 
plots of land, often relatively close to borders of riparian countries. In most 
cases, these plots are located in landscapes previously classified as ‘forest’; this 
suggests that investors may also see opportunities to extract value from tim-
ber obtained when clearing and preparing investment plots for their ‘intended 
purpose’. In Laos, the areas where forestry concessions are located exhibit 
the highest poverty rates of all areas affected by LSLAs, while in Cambodia, 
forestry deals are in average below the national mean but concern less poor 
areas compared to agricultural deals. The agrarian systems affected are partly 
subsistence farming systems but more often semi-subsistence systems because 
their relatively good accessibility enables farmers to diversify their activities to 
include growing commercial crops or earning off-farm income.
Second, agriculture is the next most important concession-related sub-
sector. Domestic and regional investors both play an important role in this 
sub-sector. Agricultural concessions are typically smaller in size than forestry 
concessions but are somewhat more accessible. In Laos, they tend to occur 
in areas displaying lower poverty incidence. Though some agricultural con-
cessions target areas classified as forests, they more frequently target existing 
croplands and thus affect populations practicing lifestyles of semi-subsistence, 
commercial agriculture, and/or off-farm activities.
3 Analysing Patterns of LSLA Implementation Processes
After identifying these general patterns and socio-ecological contexts of land 
acquisitions, we sought to distinguish the different types of implementation 
processes that steer such acquisitions. We defined implementation processes 
as encompassing all phases, from the initial negotiation of a land concession to 
the final allocation of land in specific socio-ecological contexts. Our process-
based analyses comprised three steps: (i) conducting case studies on different 
types of LSLAs in order to understand the actors, activities, and institutions 
that guide the implementation of land deals; (ii) conducting a meta-analysis 
of these case studies in which we identified common key factors and analysed 
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their role in the implementation process; (iii) pinpointing and examining 
recurrent linkages between the key factors in an effort to distinguish arche-
types of LSLA implementation processes as part of a broader typology. The 
following section describes each of these steps. While it provides a detailed 
account of the specific set of methods used and the results obtained, the case 
studies are initially described only briefly (number and type), as we wish to 
focus more attention on how they were used in our meta-analysis.
3.1 Case Studies on Implementation Processes of LSLAs
Our meta-analysis draws on 15 case studies primarily conducted as Master’s the-
sis projects between 2011 and 2013 in Laos and Cambodia, as part of a broader 
research project (Michel, 2013; Sommer, 2013; Zurflueh, 2013). Each case study 
focused on a separate company that sought to acquire land in order to invest 
in a specific crop. The case studies were designed to improve our understand-
ing of land-deal implementation processes over time (from negotiations to 
allocation of land) and across different scales, whether spatial or administra-
tive. Each was conceptually based on a human actor model that differenti-
ates the activities and agency of actors from the dynamic conditions of action 
and the intuitions in which actions are embedded (Wiesmann et al., 2011). The 
case studies were selected based on national inventories of land investments in 
Cambodia (LICADHO, 2013; ODC, 2013) and Laos (Schönweger et al., 2012) using 
factors such as crop type, investor origin, and size of concession area as sample 
criteria. A total of 22 case studies in seven Lao provinces and 8 case studies in 
two Cambodian provinces were conducted; of these, 15 were included in our 
meta-analysis (see Table 6.2).
3.2 Meta-Analysis of Case Studies on LSLA Implementation Processes
3.2.1 Identification of Key Factors
In general terms, our meta-analysis corresponds to an a posteriori compari-
son of already published case studies (Lambin and Geist, 2006). However, our 
approach differs from many meta-analyses in land science that investigate 
land use decision-making based on comparison of predefined direct or indi-
rect drivers. Because each of our case studies followed a conceptual design 
based on a human actor model (Wiesmann et al., 2011), they revealed numer-
ous interrelations between actors, actions, conditions of actions, and institu-
tions. In order to maintain this broad range of important variables and also to 
focus our analysis on the most relevant, recurrent interactions, we performed 
a sensitivity analysis for each case study as a basis for our meta-analysis. 
The sensitivity model for the analysis of dynamic systems was initially devel-
oped by Vester and Hesler (1987), and then further adapted for the analysis of 
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socio-ecological systems by Messerli (2000). It initially requires researchers to 
define a set of key factors that: (i) are representative of the social, political, 
economic, and environmental dimensions of the system; and (ii) capture key 
interactions between these factors occurring in the system.
This narrowing down of key factors was discussed and carried out together 
with the researchers who conducted the original case studies. We defined three 
general domains considered to be important mutual conditions of action in 
the LSLA implementation process: the domain of land investment, the domain 
of land governance, and the domain of the socio-ecological context. For each of 
these domains, we then chose eight key factors covering relevant components 
of the human actor model and corresponding to the criteria mentioned above 
in (i) and (ii). Table 6.3 lists all 24 key factors identified across the three general 
domains, specifying their quality and rationale.
TABLE 6.2 Case studies used for the meta-analysis of LSLA implementation processes
Crop Investors’ 
origin
Company Location (Province) Area granted 
(ha)
Rubber China Ruifeng Luangnamtha 10,000
Lilieng Vientiane Prov. 2,500
Rongxieng Savannakhet 2,407
Guangda Savannakhet 1,800
Vietnam Daklak Attapeu, Champasack 10,000
Hoang Anh Ya Lay Attapeu 10,000
Ho Chi Minh Youth Attapeu, Champasack 6,000
Viet Lao Rubber 
Joint Stock
Champasack 10,000
Thailand Lao Thai Hua Vientiane Prov. 30,000
Eucalyptus & 
Acacia
China
India
Sunpaper
Birla Lao
Savannakhet
Khammuane, 
Savannakhet
39,000
50,000
Japan Oji Lao Khammuane 50,000
Coffee Singapore Outspan Champasack 2,900
Thailand Paksong Highland Champasack 3,100
Sugar cane Thailand Mitr Lao Savannakhet 10,000
Source: Authors.
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TABLE 6.3 Key factors in LSLA implementation processes
# Key factor Quality and rationale
Do
m
ain
 of
 la
nd
 in
ve
stm
en
t
1. Origin of investors Country of origin
2. Type of crop Intention of investment
3. Time of investment Year when land was allocated
4. Access to political power Investors’ access to political power including 
historical ties and political backing in host 
country and country of origin
5. Access to cheap labour 
force
Perceived and actual availability and price of 
labour force
6. Size of company Overall power of company including access to 
capital and stock exchange
7. CSR commitment Investors’ commitments to corporate social 
and environmental sustainability and a good 
reputation
8. Size of concession Total size of land requested and granted for 
investment
Do
m
ain
 of
 la
nd
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
9. Economic growth 
strategies
Government endeavours to push economic 
growth through regional integration and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in land
10. Policies related to land Includes policies related to shifting cultivation, 
land use planning, infrastructure development, 
relocation, etc.
11. Top-down granting of 
concessions
Central level officials granting concessions and 
delegating implementation to lower 
administrative levels
12. Power of district/
provincial officials
Power of provincial and district officials 
actively involved in granting rights and support 
to investors
13. Experience with LSLAs Decision makers’ prior experience of LSLAs
14. Patronage and corruption Patronage and corruption among different 
stakeholders and also across sectors and levels
15. Land tenure insecurity Legal pluralism and relative power differentials 
of institutions governing land access and land 
use rights
16. Land surveys Companies and/or government collecting 
information on land, involved stakeholders, 
and possible impacts
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# Key factor Quality and rationale
Do
m
ain
 of
 so
cio
-e
co
lo
gic
al 
co
nt
ex
t
17. Available and suitable 
land
Land availability as perceived by local people 
or as constructed by powerful actors and 
policies
18. Land cover and land use Pre-existing land use and land cover in areas 
targeted for land investments
19. Logging Logging prior to investment is often seen as an 
important incentive for investors or/and 
authorities involved
20. Biophysical factors and 
topography
Opportunities to acquire large and connected 
plots of land; biophysical factors influencing 
suitability such as soil, climate, altitude
21. Historical ties Confidence of rural population and local 
authorities in investors from neighbouring 
regions and countries based on a shared 
history
22. Capability and assets of 
villagers
Includes factors of well-being/poverty and 
ethnicity, as well as social relations, networks, 
etc. of villagers and their representatives
23. Accessibility Accessibility in travel time to nearby city 
centres, processing factories, and border 
crossings. Defined by topography, 
infrastructure, and land use
24. Land allocation Final identification and allocation of land to 
the investor as a new land user
Source: Authors.
3.2.2 Meta-Analysis of Case Studies and Role of Key Factors
Having defined domains and representative sets of key factors, we were then 
able to focus in a comparative manner on our main object of interest: the 
diverse interactions between these key factors. For each case study, we assessed 
any possible interactions between the 24 key factors in either direction (i.e. 
influencing or being influenced). Referring back to the original research results 
of every case study, we assessed any possible interaction between any two 
factors. Based on their knowledge of the case-study settings, the researchers 
involved rated each possible interaction between key factors on a scale from 
absent (0), through weak (0.5) and moderate (1.0), to strong (2.0). This rating 
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system enabled us to calculate the average strength of an interaction between 
any two key factors across all 15 case studies.
The matrix in Figure 6.3 summarises the most important interactions 
observed in each of the 15 case studies (shaded in dark gray). For example, 
reading across row 1 we see that the key factor (KF) Origin of Investor (KF 
1) has a direct and strong influence on Access to Political Power (KF 4) and 
on the Size of Concession (KF 8). Similarly, reading down column 17 we see 
that Available Land (KF 17) is influenced by various key factors from differ-
ent domains, including: Type of Crop (KF 2), Time of Investment (KF 3), and 
Size of Concession (KF 8) from the land investment domain; Policies Related 
to Land (KF 10), Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15), and Land Surveys (KF 16) 
from the governance domain; and Capability and Assets of Villagers (KF 22), 
Accessibility (KF 23), etc. from the domain of socio-ecological context. Among 
other things, this powerfully demonstrates that, in practice, ‘available land’ 
(KF 17) cannot be observed strictly by means of remote sensing or according to 
environmental indicators; rather, it is something that is constructed based on 
power relations between actors and according to relevant policies.
Beyond looking at influences from a first factor on a second factor, we can 
use the matrix to examine how a second factor influences a third factor, and so 
on. This makes it possible to describe whole chains of interactions. For exam-
ple, the Time of Investment (KF 3) is seen to strongly influence the Power of 
District/Provincial Officials (KF 12); indeed, during the early years of conces-
sion granting, alliances between provincial officials and investors flourished, 
and land deals did not require national-level approval. Provincial officials (KF 
12), in turn, strongly influence the way Land Surveys are conducted (KF 16). As 
a consequence, provincial officials are able to define Available Land (KF 17) 
according to their own interests and those of investors. Finally, this definition 
of Available Land (KF 17) determines Land Allocation (KF 24) and the granting 
of contiguous plots and large Sizes of Concessions (KF 8).
Perhaps of even greater interest from a policy perspective is to identify 
which key factors play the biggest role in particular outcomes of the LSLA 
implementation process. Our meta-analysis provides information on the gen-
eral role played by each factor, in particular how strongly each factor interacts 
with others in the system and whether it exerts or is subject to more influence 
overall. To this end, we calculated: (i) the sum of the influences that each factor 
exerts (referred to as the active sum, or AS, for each row), and (ii) the sum of the 
influences that each factor is subject to (referred to as the passive sum, or PS, for 
each column). By comparing the active sum of any given factor with its passive 
sum, we can calculate its activity ratio (AR=AS/PS)—that is, whether and to 
what extent it exerts a greater influence than it is subject to. In addition, it is 
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very useful to calculate how strongly each factor interacts with other factors. 
This can be done by multiplying the active sum by the passive sum to arrive at 
the total strength of interaction (IR =AS*PS).
Next, we identified all the factors that display activity ratios where the 
active sum outweighs the passive sum (AS/PS >1). These factors may be seen 
as having the biggest influence on the outcomes of the implementation pro-
cess. In the land investment domain, these factors comprise Origin of Investor 
(KF 1), Type of Crop (KF 2), Time of Investment (KF 3), and Size of Company 
(KF 6). Indeed, the case studies we analysed showed that large companies—
mainly from Vietnam and China—that arrived early and invested in forestry 
concessions (e.g. rubber, eucalyptus) were generally able to obtain large plots 
of land, where they wanted them, with little to no resistance or administrative 
obstacles. By contrast, relatively small companies and latecomers experienced 
significantly more problems and were required to cooperate with district 
officials, to conduct land surveys, and to negotiate the allocation of smaller 
plots of land with villagers. In the land governance domain, the most influ-
ential key factors comprise national-level Economic Growth Strategies (KF 9) 
and Policies Related to Land (KF 10), as well as different actors’ Experience 
with LSLAs (KF 13). In the socio-ecological context domain, only Accessibility 
(KF 23) of urban centres appears to play an influential role; Biophysical Factors 
(KF 20) and Historical Ties (KF 21) exhibit positive activity ratios but appear 
only weakly interrelated.
Finally, we identified all the factors that display activity ratios where the 
passive sum outweighs the active sum (AS/PS<1) but which are highly inter-
related. These factors may not have the power to influence the outcomes of 
the implementation process; however, because they are strongly influenced 
by many other factors, they serve as useful indicators of the type of imple-
mentation process in question. The most important of these indicative factors 
are the quantity and quality of Available Land (KF 17) and Land Allocation 
(KF 24), which vary substantially depending on whether the corresponding 
implementation process occurs in a more authoritarian/top-down or par-
ticipatory/bottom-up manner. Further, Size of Concession (KF 8) serves as an 
excellent indicator of the type of implementation process, since careful nego-
tiations and planning processes usually result in more fragmented, modestly 
sized plots than originally anticipated or desired by investors. Lastly, the fol-
lowing factors serve as useful indicators of the monitoring of the implementa-
tion process—that is to say, in terms of the role they play: the type and quality 
of Land Surveys conducted (KF 16), the role attributed to pre-existing Land 
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Use (KF 18), and the Capability and Assets of Villagers (KF 22). The fact that 
villagers’ capabilities only serve as an indicator and not as an influential fac-
tor suggests that villagers’ empowerment is subject to very real constraints. 
Indeed, from a systemic perspective, other factors have a much bigger role in 
the outcome of LSLA implementation processes.
3.3 Archetypes of LSLA Implementation Processes and Resulting Typology
As shown above, our meta-analysis enabled generalisation, based on 15 case 
studies, of the importance of different key factors in the LSLA implementation 
process. As we have also seen, however, the interactions between these factors 
display different qualities and levels of strength, involve feedback mechanisms 
and chain-like effects, and ultimately lead to different outcomes. In an effort to 
account for such differentiations in our meta-analysis, we looked for recurrent 
linkages between the key factors, links that may point to archetypal patterns. 
So defined, the resulting archetypes could provide the basis for a working 
typology of LSLA implementation processes.
For this purpose, we analysed how the three main domains of the implemen-
tation processes—namely, land investment, land governance, and socio-ecolog-
ical context—influenced each other. For example, do the combined factors 
from the land governance domain exert a greater influence on the combined 
factors from the land investment domain or vice versa? To find out, we anal-
ysed the matrix of influences for every case study (Figure 6.3) and calculated 
the balance of influences between any two domains of the implementation 
process. Our analysis of all 15 case studies revealed four distinct archetypes in 
terms of the way the main domains influence each other (Figure 6.4). They are 
detailed below.
3.3.1 Archetype 1: Marginal People
Our analysis of the interrelations between the selected key factors revealed the 
following pattern among eight of the 15 case studies: a net influence exerted 
by the domains of land governance and land investment, respectively, on the 
domain of the socio-ecological context; and, at the same time, a net influence 
exerted by land investment on the land governance domain (observe the direc-
tions of the arrows in the outer ring of Figure 6.5). Based on this shared pat-
tern, we posit an implementation-process archetype we refer to as ‘Marginal 
People’: land acquisitions in this category are essentially steered by the claims 
of powerful external actors, irrespective of local realities, thus exploiting and 
exacerbating the weak position of marginalised populations.
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For the majority of the case studies in this category, analysis of the recurrent 
interactions between key factors (Figure 6.5) reveals strong ties in the land 
investment domain. Origin of Investor (KF 1)—typically neighbouring coun-
tries such as Vietnam, China, or Thailand—is positively correlated with the 
Size of Company (KF 6) and has a favourable influence on investors’ Access 
to Political Power (KF 4). In many cases, strong alliances were established 
between investors and provincial authorities on either side of nearby national 
borders. These factors, corresponding to strong political and economic back-
ing, in turn influence the intended Size of Concession (KF 8)—relatively large 
in these case studies (44,500 ha for pulp concessions and 10,000 ha for rubber 
concessions, on average). The strengths of the land investment domain led to 
FIGURE 6.5 Archetype ‘Marginal People’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
the net balance of mutual influence between domains.
Source: Authors.
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recurrent influences on both the domain of socio-ecological context and on the 
domain of land governance. Notably, the definition of Available and Suitable 
Land (KF 17) appears to be defined by the Type of Crop (KF 2) and on the Size 
of Concession (KF 8) requested. Further, the efficient Top-Down Granting of 
Concessions (KF 11) corresponds to investors who arrived early on. Due to their 
lack of Experience with LSLAs (KF 13), local authorities and villagers could be 
easily swayed by empty promises. While key factors of the local socio-ecological 
context may influence the definition of Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) 
to a certain degree, they have limited influence on the Time of Investment 
(KF 3), Type of Crop (KF 2), or Size of Concession (KF 8). At the same time, key 
factors from the land investment domain influence processes in the domain 
of land governance. Investors’ Access to Political Power (KF 4) and economic 
power corresponds to Top-Down Granting of Land Concessions (KF 11), which 
limits the Power of District/Provincial Officials (KF 12). Such access to power 
also strongly influences the conduct of Land Surveys (KF 16), contributing 
to greater Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15). These factors together influence 
what is defined as Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) and to what degree the 
Capability and Assets of Villagers come into play (KF 22).
3.3.2 Archetype 2: Marginal Governance
Four cases of rubber investments from Chinese and Thai companies revealed 
a different pattern of recurrent interactions among key factors. While the 
net influence emerging from the land investment domain still dominates 
the influence of the socio-ecological context and the land governance domains, 
respectively, key factors in the socio-ecological context now clearly affect 
land governance. We refer to this archetype as ‘Marginal Governance’, since land 
governance here is shaped by specificities of the socio-ecological context, but 
still remains largely under the control of the land investment domain.
The recurrent interrelations of key factors in these four case studies (Fig-
ure 6.6) once again point to strong investors, namely two relatively small 
and two large companies (Ruifeng from China, and Lao Thai Hua from Thai-
land), which were initially granted concession areas of 10,000 ha and 30,000 
ha, respectively. These large investments exerted powerful influences on the 
Power of Provincial/District Officials (KF 12) and the implementation of Land 
Surveys (KF 16). In addition, the Size of Concession (KF 8), Time of Investment 
(KF 3), and Type of Crop (KF 2) dictated what land was deemed available and 
needed to be allocated.
Also notable in these cases, key factors of the socio-ecological context were 
not simply overruled by outside forces. We observe in Figure 6.6 that Available 
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Land and Suitable Land (KF 17), Land Cover and Land Use (KF 18), Capability 
and Assets of Villagers (KF 22), and Accessibility (KF 23) exerted an influence 
on the Size of Concession (KF 8) and the Power of District/Provincial Officials 
(KF 12), and shaped the outcomes of the Land Survey (KF 16). In other words, 
the definition of available land and the final allocation of land were also influ-
enced by people, by pre-existing land use, topography, and accessibility. This 
new pattern can be explained as follows: firstly, large companies with higher 
CSR standards (and a sensitivity to reputational risks), such as the Lao Thai 
Hua company, explicitly followed a bottom-up approach, paying careful atten-
tion to the context of the investment. Others, such as the Rongxieng Company, 
FIGURE 6.6 Archetype ‘Marginal Governance’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
the net balance of mutual influence between domains.
Source: Authors.
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also adopted a more bottom-up approach, but only following initial bad 
experiences using an authoritarian approach (involving use of armed soldiers). 
The key characteristics of this archetype of implementation processes are 
strong investors who maintain control but pay careful attention to the socio-
ecological context and allow it to shape land governance. Such investors are 
willing to accept a slower LSLA implementation process, smaller concessions 
than originally planned, or the subdivision of concessions into multiple plots. 
In one case, such perceived downsides were compensated for by means of 
high-value timber-extraction activities during land clearing.
3.3.3 Archetype 3: Marginal Investments
One case study involving a Japanese pulp production company exhibited 
a unique pattern of LSLA implementation, which did not fit with the other 
archetypes. In this case, the land investment domain was clearly dominated by 
factors in the land governance and socio-ecological context domains, ultimately 
threatening the whole project. While it is only a single case, we wish to high-
light it as it may point to a unique archetype that we will refer to as ‘Marginal 
Investments’.
In this type of LSLA implementation process (Figure 6.7) the company 
experienced a very smooth start because it was able to take over a pre-existing 
concession and benefited from Access to Political Power (KF 4) through high-
level diplomatic ties. Despite its promising start, however, years have passed 
and the company continues to struggle to actually have the land allocated. 
They lack support from District/Provincial Officials (KF 12) and there is no lon-
ger enough Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) due to the earlier ‘land rush’ 
(Time of Investment—KF 3). Villagers and authorities from districts/prov-
inces have also learned from past Experience with LSLAs (KF 13) and are now 
able to negotiate better conditions for land deals. In such cases, the Capability 
and Assets of Villagers (KF 22) and local authorities—that is, their ability to 
resist coercion or financial temptations and to negotiate effectively with com-
panies and district officials—considerably influence contractual modalities 
(e.g. contract farming or concession type) and the overall terms of investment 
(e.g. land area, compensation). This has led the company in question to pur-
sue a more bottom-up approach, fulfilling CSR commitments. However, this 
approach has allowed local socio-ecological factors—pre-existing Land Cover 
and Land Use (KF 18) and lack of Available Land and Suitable Land (KF 17)—
to act as constraints, increasing the risk of investment failure. In response, 
the company recently diversified the crops it intends to produce from euca-
lyptus to a variety of agricultural products, and is conducting market and 
suitability studies.
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3.3.4 Archetype 4: Marginal Land
Finally, two case studies—involving a Vietnamese and a Chinese rubber 
investment, respectively—revealed yet another pattern of LSLA implementa-
tion. We believe these companies provide a good example of effectively tar-
geting agricultural investments towards underused land, and we refer to the 
corresponding archetype as ‘Marginal land’. In these cases: the socio-ecological 
context mainly influences land governance; land governance controls the land 
investment domain; and land investment, in turn, shapes the socio-ecological 
context (Figure 6.8).
First of all, the recurrent interactions observed between key factors indi-
cate limited economic and political power on the part of the companies 
FIGURE 6.7 Archetype ‘Marginal Investment’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
the net balance of mutual influence between domains.
Source: Authors.
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involved. While the land investment domain had some influence on the way 
Land Surveys (KF 16) were carried out, it did not significantly influence Policies 
Related to Land (KF 10) or Top-Down Granting of Concessions (KF 11). This 
prevented the investors from manipulating aspects of land governance to their 
advantage. The search for Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) proved to be a 
very difficult endeavour for the investors. As they arrived later than other com-
panies in the respective regions, their own interests—for example, obtaining a 
large Size of Concession (KF 8) or producing a specific Type of Crop (KF 2)—
played a limited role in defining what was deemed available. They were obliged 
to negotiate locally regarding available land and, as a result, key factors of the 
FIGURE 6.8 Archetype ‘Marginal Land’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in implementation 
processes of large-scale land acquisition (manifesting an average rating  
≥ 1.25). Outer arrows refer to the net balance of mutual influences between 
domains.
Source: Authors.
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socio-ecological context—such as Land Cover and Land Use (KF 18), Biophysical 
Factors and Topography (KF 20), Accessibility (KF 23), and Capability and 
Assets of Villagers (KF 22)—played a significant role. Though it was a lengthy 
and frequently complicated process, the resulting Land Allocation (KF 24) 
was the most inclusive of all those observed, with both villagers and investors 
agreeing to it. These actors then sought support in terms of land governance 
from provincial and district authorities, eventually requesting Land Surveys 
(KF 16) and formal recognition of the agreements. Ultimately, these processes 
positively influenced the implementation of Policies Related to Land (KF 10) 
and Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15) (the latter in the sense that such insecurity 
was reduced).
4 Synthesis and Discussion
In previous sections, we have presented the results of applying two comple-
mentary approaches to the analysis of LSLAs, in an effort to provide better 
evidence for policymaking. On the one hand, we conducted a spatially refer-
enced analysis of land acquisitions in Laos and Cambodia, revealing patterns 
of investor type, investment purpose (sub-sector), and socio-ecological con-
texts. On the other, we conducted a process-based analysis of LSLA implemen-
tation, reaching from initial negotiations to the final allocation of land. This 
was done by means of a meta-analysis of case studies in which we identified 
recurrent interactions between selected key factors of LSLA implementation. 
This enabled us to identify possible archetypes that could serve as a basis for a 
working typology of LSLA implementation processes.
Both approaches are capable of generating policy-relevant information, but 
each has clear limitations on its own (discussed below). That fact brings us 
back to our guiding question: can distinct spatial patterns be tied to specific 
types of LSLA implementation processes by means of common indicators? 
This would enable observers to either interpret spatial patterns in terms of 
underlying implementation processes, or to validate and generalise case-study 
findings regarding implementation processes to inform policies at higher spa-
tial levels.
Our spatial analysis of LSLA inventories revealed two general patterns. 
(1) Numerous regional investors and some domestic investors have engaged 
in forestry sub-sectors, mainly focussing on rubber and eucalyptus or aca-
cia plantations. The corresponding concessions are generally large, contigu-
ous plots of land found in somewhat inaccessible landscapes once classified 
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as forest or shrub land. The populations affected by these concessions are 
generally poorer than the respective national poverty line of each country and 
often practice small-scale agriculture (mainly, in Laos, shifting cultivation). (2) 
A mix of regional, domestic, and some international investors have engaged 
in agricultural sub-sectors. Their concessions are generally smaller and often 
compete with pre-existing cropping mosaics cultivated by smallholders. The 
affected areas are usually relatively accessible and populated by less-poor peo-
ple in Laos and by poorer people in Cambodia.
These insights are consistent with a growing body of evidence showing that 
LSLAs are a strong driver of agrarian transition in South-East Asia (Anseeuw 
et al., 2012). LSLAs have increased exponentially, making rural areas the site 
of fierce competition over resources in settings where powerful investors 
from riparian countries play a key role (Schönweger et al., 2012). Our analy-
sis shows that optimistic assumptions about investment mainly flowing to 
‘marginal land’—that is, land that is unused yet suitable for agriculture—are 
fundamentally flawed (Borras Jr. et al., 2011; Cotula et al., 2009; Messerli et al., 
2014). Instead, land concessions are increasing resource competition, affecting 
two vulnerable groups in particular: smallholders in densely populated crop-
ping mosaics; and poorer ethnic minorities in forest mosaics where shifting 
cultivation is common. Overall, spatial, quantitative analysis of land conces-
sions clearly demonstrates that LSLAs are and will remain a driving force of 
agrarian transition in the region. Given the advanced stage of expansion into 
agricultural and forested landscapes and existing conflicts with affected land 
users, policymaking questions should no longer be limited to whether to per-
mit, prevent, or regulate the arrival of LSLAs in the area. Rather, the focus must 
increasingly shift to policies relevant to conflict resolution, labour issues, and 
outmigration as new drivers of poverty.
In view of such questions, our analysis of spatial patterns remains very 
coarse and provides insufficient differentiation. While some general correla-
tions can be posited between the origins of investors, the type of operations 
they conduct, and the socio-ecological contexts targeted, we neither under-
stand the causalities of LSLA implementation processes nor can we identify 
the precise spatio-temporal contexts with the most vulnerable environments 
and populations.
However, our meta-analysis of case studies reveals a more differentiated 
picture of the processes behind the implementation of LSLAs. The majority of 
our case studies pointed to an archetype of LSLA implementation processes 
that we have termed ‘Marginal People’. In this sort of authoritarian, top-down 
LSLA implementation process, ‘available land’ is defined less according to local 
socio-ecological factors than it is according to factors from the domains of 
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investment and land governance. Contrary to the analysis of spatial patterns, 
we found that this type of implementation process can be observed both in 
the forestry sector and in the agricultural sector, encompassing crops as varied 
as rubber, eucalyptus, coffee, and sugar cane. Also, it involved investors from 
different countries of origin, both regional and international. Closely related 
to this type of LSLA implementation is the archetype we refer to as ‘Marginal 
Governance’. It too is characterised by a strong investment domain but is some-
what shaped by the socio-ecological context, providing an empowerment to 
the socio-ecological context vis-à-vis policy pressures. Nevertheless, the eco-
nomic and political power wielded by investors means that land governance is 
ultimately constrained in its effectiveness.
The remaining case studies were attributed to two more recent types of LSLA 
implementation processes. One type we refer to as ‘Marginal Investments’, in 
which investors struggle to obtain land. Accepting that available land—as 
defined by local land users—is very scarce, and lacking government support, 
investors in this category face the very real prospect of total failure. Investors 
also face possible failure in the final archetype we identified, ‘Marginal Land’. 
This category comprises rubber companies that arrived late to the region and 
were forced to follow a more bottom-up approach in their search to find suit-
able land—by now exceedingly scarce. Their negotiations with local land users 
resulted in the most inclusive form of LSLA implementation we observed. 
After reaching an agreement about available land, villagers and investors 
jointly sought the support of district and provincial land governance institu-
tions, which in turn lent their support to the investment domain.
Our analysis of LSLA implementation processes reveals various policy-
relevant insights. First, we found that authoritarian forms of implementation 
dominate, as was suggested by the spatial patterns identified earlier. However, 
in contrast to our initial spatial observations, we found that investors from 
other countries besides Vietnam and China were also involved in top-down 
modes of implementation. In general, authoritarian implementation processes 
appear to be associated with powerful companies who arrived on the scene 
early, just after foreign direct investment had received policy approval, and had 
access to political elites within the government. These sorts of implementa-
tion processes occur very quickly, leaving little space for policy intervention. 
In these cases, openings for local people to voice their interests only appear to 
occur when they are granted by the investors themselves, whether for strategic 
reasons or because of commitments to corporate social responsibility.
Second, we found that new, more inclusive models of implementation 
emerge as land concessions begin to proliferate. Notably, these emerging mod-
els of implementation may provide spaces for policy intervention, whether at 
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the national, provincial, or local level. Yet, it should be noted that they have not 
emerged due to regulatory measures, but rather due to the increasing scarcity 
of available land, competition between investors, and the learning processes 
of actors at different policy levels. One archetype emerging in this advanced 
stage of land acquisitions is that of failing land investments. This trend also 
appears to be reflected globally, as evidenced by the high rates of abandoned 
deals found in the Land Matrix (Land Matrix Partnership, 2014). Notably, 
failed deals could also provide space for a policy reboot in favour of more 
inclusive forms of land investment and agricultural development. Finally, the 
last archetype we identified—‘Marginal Land’—points to alternative modes 
of agricultural investment that are actually beginning to occur. They appear to 
materialise once socio-ecological constraints—for example, demographic and 
environmental realities—begin to outweigh economic and political power. 
This newly emerging archetype has not received a lot of attention so far, but 
may come to play an increasingly important role worldwide.
We believe that such archetypes of implementation processes could 
contribute to a better, more differentiated and policy relevant understand-
ing of LSLAs as driving forces of agrarian transitions. But this requires us to 
validate and generalise such archetypes to inform policies at higher spatial 
levels. Ideally, this could be done by linking our process-based archetypes 
with observable place-based (spatially referenced) patterns of LSLAs. In other 
words, we wish to identify whether these archetypes display spatial signatures 
that can be extrapolated using spatio-temporal data sets spanning larger geo-
graphic areas. Table 6.4 lists the key factors of our process-based archetypes 
and highlights the key factors for which spatio-temporal data sets are readily 
available.
As seen in Table 6.4, the key factors for which data from inventories and 
spatial layers are available (shaded rows in Table 6.4) only marginally overlap 
with the most important indicators of the different archetypes of LSLA imple-
mentation processes. With the exception of the Size of Concessions, it seems 
that no other key factor differentiating the four archetypes can be quantified 
with currently available spatio-temporal data sets. Conversely, many of the 
indicators that are decisive to LSLA implementation processes are difficult or 
impossible to capture fully using spatially explicit, country-level data; the most 
prominent example being Available and Suitable Land (KF 17). No statistics or 
map can adequately capture the characteristics of this factor. Correspondingly, 
spatial signatures differentiating these four archetypes can scarcely be extrap-
olated in time and space. However, a closer look at the indicators shows that 
expanding the information collected by existing inventories could make a big 
difference. If factors such as Time of Investment (KF 3) and characteristics of 
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TABLE 6.4 Synthesising implementation processes and spatial patterns of land acquisitions
Key factors Marginal  
people
Marginal 
governance
Marginal 
investment
Marginal land
Do
m
ain
 of
 la
nd
 in
ve
stm
en
t
Origin of investor 1
Type of crop 2
Time of investment 3 Early arrivals Early arrivals Late arrivals
Access to political power 4 High level ties, 
diplomatic
Access to cheap labor force 5
Size of company 6 Large size Large size Large as well 
as small
Large as well as 
small
CSR commitment 7 Generally high
Size of concession 8 Large, connected 
plots
Large, 
connected plots
Small, flexible
Do
m
ain
 of
 la
nd
 go
ve
rn
an
ce
Economic growth 
strategies
9
Policies related to land 10
Top-down granting of 
concessions
11
Power of district/province 
officials
12 High, 
influencing land 
surveys
Weak, 
infuenced by 
investment
High Strong, drawing 
on soc.-ecol. 
context
Experience with LSLAs 13
Patronage and corruption 14
Land tenure insecurity 15
Land surveys 16 Not or partly 
implemented
Implemented Carefully 
implemented
Carefully 
implemented
Do
m
ain
 of
 so
cio
-e
co
lo
gic
al 
co
nt
ex
t Available and suitable land 17 Defined by 
investment and 
governance
Defined by 
investment and 
soc.-ecol. 
context
Defined by 
soc.-ecol. 
context
Defined by 
investment and 
soc.-ecol. 
context
Land cover and land use 18 Reflected in lad 
survey
Reflected in 
land survey
Logging 19
Biophysical factors and 
topography
20 Reflected in 
land survey
Historical ties 21
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Land Allocation (KF 24) were made publicly accessible and were more exhaus-
tive, they could serve as excellent proxies for the type of implementation 
process. Furthermore, existing LSLA monitoring systems could additionally 
incorporate indicators such as the role of provincial or district authorities in 
the implementation process, the way Land Surveys (KF 16) were implemented, 
and the Capabilities and Assets of Villagers (KF 22). Finally, refining methods 
to understand who and what define the availability of land would represent a 
breakthrough for understanding the processes of land allocation.
5 Conclusions
The research we have described is intended to help overcome certain persistent 
difficulties of providing adequate, robust evidence on LSLAs for the purpose of 
decision-making and policymaking, specifically in Laos and Cambodia. Much 
of this difficulty stems from the existing gap between case study research—
which typically provides qualitative and process-based insights—and national 
or global inventories that typically provide place-based (spatially referenced) 
and quantitative analyses of broader patterns. Using a meta-analysis of case 
studies that focuses on recurrent interactions between selected key factors, we 
defined four archetypes of implementation processes. We argue that this type 
Key factors Marginal  
people
Marginal 
governance
Marginal 
investment
Marginal land
Capability and assets of 
villagers
22 Indications of 
needs 
expressed
Strong 
negotiation 
power
Strong 
negotiation 
power
Accessibility 23
Land allocation 24 Fast, majority of 
concession 
allocated
Parts of 
concession, 
slow, change of 
location
Slow, 
fragmented, 
small share of
Slow, 
fragmented
Note: The table lists the key factors of our four archetypes and existing spatio-temporal data sets 
that capture these key factors. Shaded rows indicate key factors for which statistical and spatial 
data are readily available.
Source: Authors.
TABLE 6.4 Synthesising implementation processes and spatial patterns (cont.)
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of generalisation not only provides insights for land-related policies, but also 
represents a precondition for linking process-based insights with spatial pat-
terns emerging from place-based studies.
Methodologically, we conclude that both approaches generate valuable 
yet incomplete evidence for policymaking. Spatial patterns mask important 
differentiations and do not enable causal understanding. At the same time, a 
working typology of LSLA implementation processes such as ours is difficult to 
assess in terms of its validity for higher levels of policymaking and scaling up 
to different contexts. Finding ways of linking these two perspectives remains 
a crucial task. At present, there is a dearth of available indicators serving 
both perspectives, making it difficult to properly link them. Yet, the solution is 
clearly within reach: inventories of land acquisitions could make these kinds 
of indicators available with little extra effort. They would need to document 
how the size and contiguity of a land deal changes over time from the grant-
ing of concessions to the final allocation of land. Additionally, information 
on the use and form of land surveys as well as the time and type of involve-
ment of different actors represents an important proxy for implementation 
processes.
We believe that this type of combined approach is capable of generating 
important evidence to inform policy. It enables a better understanding of the 
overall dimensions and relevance of LSLAs in agrarian transitions. Our own 
quantitative results point to a highly advanced stage of LSLA proliferation in 
South-East Asia, necessitating new policies capable of addressing conflicts, 
impacts on pre-existing land use and natural resources, threatened livelihoods, 
and outmigration, which could all drive new waves of poverty. At the same 
time, our analysis of implementation processes clearly shows that there is little 
space for participatory forms of agricultural investment when large and pow-
erful companies initially arrive on the scene in a new region and are essentially 
given a pass by senior government authorities. For a long time, the prevailing 
processes of land allocation in Laos and Cambodia were top-down and author-
itarian, further marginalising vulnerable populations. Only now, as land has 
become scarcer and competition between investors has increased, are new, 
more inclusive implementation processes emerging. These implementation 
processes enable various stakeholders to agree on what land is truly underused 
or ‘marginal’, and thus ripe for investment. In terms of future land policies, this 
suggests a role for spatially differentiated moratoria on land concessions. In 
other words, policymakers could ban concessions in certain areas and allow 
them in others, encouraging competition between investors and negotiation 
with local land areas in certain places, while keeping other places free of land 
concessions to protect vulnerable smallholders.
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